Pay-what-you-want in competition. Forthcoming in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.

What drives home solar PV uptake? Subsidies, peer effects and visibility in Sweden (with Luis Mundaca). Energy Research & Social Science, 2020, 60:101319.

Curating social image: experimental evidence on the value of actions and selfies (with Håkan J. Holm). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2018, 148:83-104. Media: press release, radio segment

Venting and gossiping in conflicts: verbal expression in ultimatum games. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2017, 67:111-121.

Pay-what-you-want pricing schemes: a self-image perspective (with Goytom Abraha Kahsay). Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 2015, 7:17-28.

Effect of effort on self-image: monotonically increasing self-image functions. Economics Bulletin, 2013, 33(1):152-157.


Behavioural economics for energy and climate change policies and the transition to a sustainable energy use: a Scandinavian perspective (with Luis Mundaca, Jonas Sonnenschein and Roman Seidl). In M. Lopes, C. Henggeler Antunes and K. B. Janda (Eds.), Energy and Behavior: Towards a Low Carbon Future, 2020, 45-87. London: Academic Press.


Pessimism and overcommitment (with Claes Ek)

Economic agents commonly use commitment devices to limit impulsive behavior in the interest of long-term goals. We provide evidence for excess demand for commitment in a laboratory experiment. Subjects are faced with a tedious productivity task and a tempting option to surf the internet. Subjects state their willingness-to-pay for a commitment device that removes the option to surf. The commitment device is then allocated with some probability, thus allowing us to observe the behavior of subjects who demand commitment but have to face temptation. We find that a significant share of the subjects overestimate their demand for commitment when compared to their material loss from facing the temptation. This is true even when we take into account the potential desire to avoid psychological costs from being tempted. Assuming risk aversion does not change our conclusion, though it suggests that pessimism in expected performance, rather than psychological cost, is the main driver of overcommitment. Our results suggest there is a need to reconsider the active promotion of commitment devices in situations where there is limited disutility from the tempting option.


Mood effect in the field and in the mind (with Håkan J. Holm)

Using a large dataset containing over 46 million car inspections in Sweden and England in 2016 and 2017, we study whether inspectors are more lenient on days when their mood is predicted to be good, and if car owners exploit the mood effect by selecting these days to inspect low quality cars. Different sources of good mood are studied: Fridays, sunny days, and days following major sports results, with varying degrees of the car owner’s ability to plan for inspection, and hence the likelihood of selection bias. We find limited evidence to support the existence of mood effect in this domain, despite survey results showing belief to the contrary. There is indication of selection effect on the part of car owners, but the effect is economically small. Our findings cast doubt on previous mood effects found in the field.