What drives home solar PV uptake? Subsidies, peer effects and visibility in Sweden (with Luis Mundaca). Energy Research & Social Science, 2020, 60:101319.
Pay-what-you-want in competition. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2019, 20(1).
Curating social image: experimental evidence on the value of actions and selfies (with Håkan J. Holm). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2018, 148:83-104. Media: press release, radio segment
Venting and gossiping in conflicts: verbal expression in ultimatum games. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2017, 67:111-121.
Pay-what-you-want pricing schemes: a self-image perspective (with Goytom Abraha Kahsay). Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 2015, 7:17-28.
Effect of effort on self-image: monotonically increasing self-image functions. Economics Bulletin, 2013, 33(1):152-157.
Behavioural economics for energy and climate change policies and the transition to a sustainable energy use: a Scandinavian perspective (with Luis Mundaca, Jonas Sonnenschein and Roman Seidl). In M. Lopes, C. Henggeler Antunes and K. B. Janda (Eds.), Energy and Behavior: Towards a Low Carbon Future, 2020, 45-87. London: Academic Press.
Economic agents use commitment devices to limit impulsive behavior in the interest of long-term goals, but the possibility of demanding too much commitment has been given little attention in previous studies. We provide evidence for excess demand for commitment in a laboratory experiment. Subjects are faced with a tedious productivity task and a tempting option to surf the internet. Subjects state their willingness-to-pay for a commitment device that removes the option to surf. The commitment device is then allocated with some probability, thus allowing us to observe the behavior of subjects who demand commitment but have to face temptation. We find that a significant share of the subjects overestimate their demand for commitment, as indicated by their willingness-to-pay, when compared to their realized material loss from facing the temptation. This is true even when we take into account the potential desire to avoid psychological costs from being tempted. Excess demand for commitment is driven by pessimism in both productivity and likelihood of succumbing under temptation. Our results suggest there is a need to reconsider the active promotion of commitment devices in situations where there is limited disutility from the tempting option.
We conduct what we believe to be the most methodologically rigorous study of mood effect in the field so far to measure its economic impact and address shortcomings in the existing literature. Using a large dataset containing over 46 million car inspections in Sweden and England in 2016 and 2017, we study whether inspectors are more lenient on days when their mood is predicted to be good, and if car owners exploit the mood effect by selecting these days to inspect low quality cars. Different sources of good mood are studied: Fridays, sunny days, and days following unexpected wins by the local soccer team, with varying degrees of the car owner’s ability to plan for inspection, and hence the likelihood of selection bias. We find limited evidence to support the existence of mood effects in this domain, despite survey results showing belief to the contrary. There is some indication of selection effect on the part of car owners. Our findings cast doubt on previous mood effects found in the field.
WORK IN PROGRESS
Regulatory load and charitable-giving
COVID-19, gender difference in productivity and trends in experimental economics
Increasing female participation in economics (with Orla Doyle)
What drives preferences for affirmative action? (with Demid Getik and Marco Islam)
Stocking up or putting off? Durability versus procrastination in explaining transitory effects in healthcare spending (with Kevin Devereux)